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Venue concerns the convenience and fairness of the location of the court
to the parties involved in the trial of an action. In contrast, jurisdictional
questions are concerned with the court's power over the parties or subject
matter of a civil action. Venue is a personal right subject to waiver either
by stipulation or involuntarily by failing to assert timely objection to
improper venue. If improper venue is raised in a timely manner, the
normal response of the court is to transfer the action to a location where
venue is proper, if such is available.1
IBy contrast, improper or lack of personal jurisdiction may result in dismissal
of the action, unless the defendant has waived the right to contest it by failing
to contest it in his answer or pre-answer motion. Improper or lack of subject
matter jurisdiction may be asserted at any time, and normally results in dismissal
of the action.
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Venue requirements in most statutes are based on some relationship
between the locale of the court, the parties, and any real property involved
in the action. Venue may be based on the residence of plaintiff or de-
fendant, the jurisdiction in which the cause of action arose, or the location
of property involved in the action.
Venue in federal cases is controlled by the general venue statute unless
there exists an applicable special venue statute that attaches to the par-
ticular cause of action under consideration. This note is concerned with
the section of the general venue statute applicable to corporate defendants
and its interaction with the special venue statute for civil actions in patent
infringement cases (hereinafter "patent venue statute").
Congress amended the general venue statute for corporations as part
of the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988,2 witl.
the stated intent of clarifying in which district in a multi-district state
venue properly could be laid for a corporate defendant.3 The resulting
amendment has statutorily equated venue for corporate defendants with
any district in which personal jurisdiction can be obtained, thus accom-
plishing a long-sought goal of many courts and legal commentators. 4 By
its explicit language, the new residence definition for corporations re-
places that of the patent venue statute, essentially obviating the need
for a separate special venue statute for patent infringement cases in-
volving corporate defendants. The change will have significant effects in
such cases by broadening venue choices for plaintiffs and by aligning
venue in infringement cases with venue in other suits arising under the
patent laws.5
2 Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
702, tit. X, § 1013(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4669 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.), [hereinafter the "1988 Act."]
3 H. R. REP. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 70, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5982, 6031.
4 See 15 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ET. AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2d
ed. 1986) § 3811 at 117-123. 1A(2) JAMES W. MOORE, ET. AL., MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE, 0.342 [5.-1-31 at 4119 (2d ed. 1990). In support of this position, Pro-
fessor Moore argued prior to the 1988 amendment that venue should be regarded
as proper whenever the court has jurisdiction over the corporation. However, at
the time Moore was arguing for a connection between the pre-1988 Act "doing
business" of § 1391(c) and personal jurisdiction. 1 MOORE, 1 0.142 (2d ed. 1985)
(the material formerly at 1 MOORE, 0.142, is now found at 1A(2) MOORE, 0.342
(2d ed. 1987)).
5 See generally, David S. Welkowitz, Some Thoughts on Corporate Venue and
Other Foibles, 10 WHITTIER L. REv. 721 (1989). Actions such as a declaratory
judgment of patent invalidity and noninfringement are brought under the general
venue statute; the patent venue statute applies only to "civil actions for patent
infringement." 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1976).
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL VENUE PROVISIONS
A. The First Judiciary Act, 1789
As a first step in the discussion of venue, it is necessary to go back in
history over 200 years. From the creation of the federal judiciary 6 in 1789
until 1887, there was no separate venue statute for federal civil cases.
7
The section of the 1789 Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of the
federal courts included a provision making venue proper in any district
where the defendant was an inhabitant or could be found.,
B. Venue in the Late Nineteenth Century
In 1887, Congress amended the jurisdictional provisions for the federal
courts, eliminating the term "or where he may be found" as a basis for
venue in civil actions. Thus, venue was limited in a non-diversity case
to the district in which the defendant was an inhabitant.9 This statute
is generally considered to be the predecessor of today's general venue
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391."1 A corporation has for many years been deemed
to be an inhabitant of the place of its incorporation."
For example, under the 1887 venue provision a patentee 12 who lived
in and had been the victim of acts of infringement committed in California
6 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78. Chaffee v. Hayward, 61 U.S.
(20 How.) 208, 216 (1857), held patent infringement suits subject to this Act's
venue provisions.
7 See 15 WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 3802, p.8 (Supp. 1990).
8 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78-79, reads in pertinent part:
"And no civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts against an inhab-
itant of the United States, by any original process in any other district than that
whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at the time of serving
the writ, .... " Id. at 79.
9 Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, as corrected by the Act of August
13, 1888, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433. The 1888 correction did not pertain to venue.
Venue choices in diversity suits became wider than in Federal question cases,
due to this act, and persisted until passage of the Judicial Improvements Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. III, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C. See infra, note 25.
"0 See "Historial and Revision Notes" at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391 (West 1976); 15
WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 3802 at 9.
" Suttle v. Reich Bros. Constr. Co., 333 U.S. 163, 166 (1948), reh denied 333
U.S. 878 (1948); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839) ("[A]
corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty
by which it was created .... It must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot
migrate to another sovereignty.") See MOORE, supra note 4, 0.342 [5.-1-3] at
4107.
12 Throughout this note, a civil action for patent infringement will be used in
examples.
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by an infringer who was an inhabitant of New York would have had to
bring suit in New York to protect his rights. Some District courts found
reasons for avoiding the harsh results of this statute, but there was much
conflict since other courts adhered strictly to the statute."3 During the
ten years after 1887, conflicting decisions arose among the circuits re-
garding patent infringement actions under this venue provision.1 4 Two
Supreme Court decisions failed to clarify the situation and, in fact, added
to the confusion."5 Congress intervened in 1897, and passed the prede-
cessor of the present patent venue statute' 6 with the stated intent of
making it easier for patentees to protect their rights; i.e., broadening the
venue possibilities for patent infringement actions.' 7 Thus, in the above
example, the California patentee could also properly bring suit in Cali-
fornia under the 1897 law. It is noteworthy that at the time it was passed,
this special venue statute was broader than the general venue provision;
it afforded two options for proper venue, while the general venue provision
statute allowed only one.'8 The venue statute for patent infringement
suits has remained little changed in the ninety years since it was created,
using the same test today as in 1897.' 9 However, the definition of residence
for corporate defendants was modified by the 1988 Act, and that definition
from § 1391(c) has been held to apply to the patent venue statute.
C. 1948-1988: Broadening Venue Generally
In contrast to the patent venue statute, the general venue statute has
been considerably modified over the years and has become much broader.
20
In 1948 the word "resident" was substituted for "whereof he is an inhab-
itant", and the collective terms for defendant and plaintiff were substi-
1329 CONG. REC_ 1900, 1901 (1897).
14 Courts applying 1887/1888 Act to patent cases: National Typewriter v. Pope
Mfg. Co., 56 F. 849 (D. Mass. 1893); Halstead v. Manning, Bowman & Co., 34 F.
565 (S.D. N.Y. 1888); Miller Hagee Co. v. Carpenter, 34 F. 433 (S.D. Ohio 1888).
Courts refusing to apply 1887/1888 Act to patent cases: Smith v. Sargent Mfg.
Co., 67 F. 801 (S.D. N.Y. 1895); Noonan v. Chester Park Athletic Club, 75 F. 334(S.D. Ohio 1896); Earl v. Southern Pac. Co., 75 F. 609 (N.D. Cal. 1896).
See additional cases cited at 29 CONG. REC. 1900, 1901 (1897).
'-'In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653 (1893); In re Keasby & Mattison Co., 160 U.S.
221 (1895).
,r Act of March 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695.
,729 CONG. REC. at 1901.
"1 The 1887 Act limited venue to the judicial district "whereof [the defendant]
is an inhabitant." 24 Stat. at 552. In contrast, the patent venue statute allowed
suit to be brought in either the district wherein the defendant was an inhabitant
or in a district in which defendant had a regular and established place of business
and had committed acts of infringement. Compare the statutory provisions in
notes 21 and 43, infra.
19 See text of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1400(b) infra, n. 43.
10 See WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 3811, at 100-105; n. 9 at 103.
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tuted for the singular in § 1391(a).21 Section 1391(c), which controls venue
for corporate defendants, was created in 1948.22 This statute constituted
a considerable liberalization over prior law of venue in suits involving
such defendants and overcame the many hardships and inequities created
under the old venue statute. Under the old statute, a corporation could
only be sued in the district in which it was incorporated.2 3 Many courts,
nonetheless, had found various devices for avoiding these problems.
2 4
The comparatively liberal nature of diversity venue in § 1391(a) was
retained in the 1948 revision and recodification, and was amended to
arguably further broaden venue in diversity cases in 1990.25
21 Section 51 of the Judicial Code, Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 866, 24 Stat. 552,
as corrected by Act of August 3, 1888, ch. 373, 25 Stat. 433, was codified as 28
U.S.C. § 112 from 1911 to 1948. Section 112(a) read as follows: "Except as provided
in §§ 113 to 117 of this title, no person shall be arrested in one district for trial
in another in any civil action before a district court; and, except as provided in
§§ 113 to 118 of this title, no civil suit shall be brought in any district court
against any person by any original process or proceeding in any other district
than that whereof he is an inhabitant;.. ." Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167 (1939).
22 Prior to the 1988 amendment the statute read:
§ 1391 Venue generally
(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incor-
porated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial
district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue
purposes.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (West, 1976).
23 See supra, note 21.
21 See, e.g., Nierbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 175
(1939) (in diversity case, where foreign corporation has consented to suit in state
courts, it also consented to suit in federal courts in that state.) The Supreme
Court upheld this narrow venue statute immediately before the passage of the
1948 Act. Suttle v. Reich Bros. Const. Co., 333 U.S. 163, 166 (1948) (the "residence"
of a corporation is in the State and district within which it was incorporated.)
25 15 WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 3802 at 9, n. 11 (1986). This provision is the
broadest of the federal general venue statutes; until December, 1990, it allowed
venue to be laid in the district where all defendants or all plaintiffs reside, or
where the cause of action arose. "Claim arose" venue was added in 1966. In
December, 1990, Title III of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, amended § 1391 (a), (b) and (e). Section 1391(a) now
reads:
(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citi-
zenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1) a
judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the
same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events
or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of
property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district
in which the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the
action is commenced.
Note that venue is no longer proper where all plaintiffs reside, and that, like §
1391(c), venue can be based on personal jurisdiction. 7B MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE, 2d ed., JC-575-584.6 (1991). See also T. E. Mengler, et al., Recent Federal
Court Legislation Made Some Noteworthy Changes, NATL. L.J., Dec. 31, 1990, at
21.
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D. The 1988 Amendment of § 1391(c)
Prior to the 1988 amendment, the corporate venue statute allowed a
corporation to be sued in any district in which it was incorporated, li-
censed to do business or doing business.26 Many problems were experi-
enced in attempting to interpret "doing business" as a basis for selecting
venue.2 7 This however was not the primary Congressional concern leading
to the 1988 amendment of the general venue statute. Congress' concern
was with the question of proper venue in states with multiple federal
districts.28 The problem arose when a corporation was haled into court in
a district in which it was not doing business, based on its doing business
in another district in the same state. 29 The solution of this problem was
the stated purpose of the 1988 amendment. 30
The 1988 Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act 31 is perhaps
best known for increasing the minimum amount in controversy to $50,000
for diversity actions in federal court. 32
Congress amended the corporate venue statute, § 1391(c) of this Act
under Title X, Miscellaneous.A3 As a result of this amendment, 34 Section
26 See supra note 22. See also "Historical and Revision Notes", 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1391 at 7 (West, 1976).
27 15 WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 3811 at 113. Compare J.L.G. Indus., Inc. v. Mark
Indus. Inc., 684 F. Supp. 1283, 1287 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (Venue improper where
defendant had no sales representative, local telephone number or office within
the state) with Galonis v. National Broadcasting Co. 498 F. Supp. 789, 791 (D.
N.H. 1980) (Venue proper although defendant had no employees or officers per-
manently located in district).
28 See generally David D. Siegel, Changes in Federal Jurisdiction and Practice
Under the New Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, 123 F.R.D. 399
(1989). Siegel is the author of "Commentary on 1988 Revision", 28 U.S.C.A. §
1391 at 7 (1990).
123 F.R.D. at 406.
3oId.
31 Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub.L. No. 100-
702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988); effective February 17, 1989.
32 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (West Supp. 1990); Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. II, 201 to 203,
102 Stat. 4642, 4646. See generally Richard M. Klein, A Recent Revision to the
General Venue Statute Greatly Expands Plaintiffs Venue Choices Against a Cor-
porate Defendant in Federal Suits for Trademark Infringement or Unfair Com-
petition, 71 J. PAT, & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 886 (1989).
33 See supra note 31, Pub. L. No. 100-702, Title X, § 1302(a) 102 Stat. 4646,
4669 (1988).
u Following the 1988 amendment in the Judicial Improvements Act, the cor-
porate venue statute reads:
§ 1391 Venue generally
(c) For purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that is a corpo-
ration shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject
to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced. In a State
which has more than one judicial district and in which a defendant that is
a corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time an action is
commenced, such corporation shall be deemed to reside in any district in
that State within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to
personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State, and, if there is
no such district, the corporation shall be deemed to reside in the district
within which it has the most significant contacts.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (West Supp. 1990).
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1391(c) now defines residence for venue purposes as any judicial district
in which the corporate defendant would be subject to personal jurisdiction,
under the minimum contacts doctrine, if that district were a separate
state unto itself.
The second sentence of the 1988 amendment goes far to clarify corporate
venue in states having multiple judicial districts. However, the final
clause of the second sentence retains some of the ambiguity sought to be
eliminated by the amendment. This ambiguity appears in the provision
allowing venue when a corporate defendant has fewer contacts than the
minimum required in any single federal judicial district of the state, but
its total contacts with the state as a whole satisfy the requirements of
due process.35 This provision appears to retain the troublesome "doing
business" element of the former § 1391(c), although under the new statute
the extent that a corporation is "doing business" will have a bearing on
the question of personal jurisdiction, via its contacts with the forum.
In an additional change, being licensed to do business in a district is
no longer sufficient for corporate venue in that district; this may be seen
as a narrowing of venue under the 1988 amendment. 36 However, since
obtaining a license to do business normally involves the state-required
appointment of an agent to receive process, the defendant corporation
will have waived its right to contest in personam jurisdiction.
The textual change with which this note is primarily concerned, how-
ever, is the first sentence.3 7 The "chapter" in that sentence is Chapter 87
of Title 28.38 Application of the new corporate residence definition to the
entirety of Chapter 87 of Title 28 of the U.S. Code is accomplished by the
first phrase of the first sentence, by the plain meaning of the words.
Included with § 1391(c) in Chapter 87 is § 1400(b), the patent venue
statute.39 Thus, a "plain meaning" reading of the general venue statute
clearly applies the § 139 1(c) definition of residence to the "resident" term
in the patent venue statute.
40
E. General Effects of the 1988 Amendment to § 1391(c)
In the amendment of § 1391(c) as part of the Judicial Improvements
Act, Congress has essentially equated venue with personal jurisdiction
' See David D. Siegel, "Commentary on 1988 Revision" at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391,
at 7 (West Supp. 1990).
36 David D. Siegel, Changes in Federal Jurisdiction and Practice Under the
New Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, 123 F.R.D. 399, 406 (1989).
"' See supra, note 34.
" See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391 at 5 for the Table of Contents for Chapter 87, ("District
Courts - Venue") listing the venue statutes contained therein, including §§ 1391
- 1412.
39 Id.
40 VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1580 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) ("The language of the statute is clear and its meaning is unambigu-
ous."), and cases cited therein.
1991]
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in suits against corporate defendants. Notably, this 1988 venue provision
is effectively quite similar to the 1789 Judiciary Act, which also closely
tied venue to the court's jurisdiction over the defendant, since it allowed
a suit to proceed in any district in which the defendant "is an inhabitant,
or in which he shall be found,....1,,41 and the most obvious way a defendant
is "found" in any district is by serving him with valid process in that
district.
In the second sentence, the new statute relates venue to personal jur-
isdiction via the defendant corporation's minimum contacts with the
forum. Clearly, under a long line of Supreme Court cases beginning with
International Shoe v. Washington,42 the bases for personal jurisdiction
must satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.
What is not as clear is whether the words "contacts... sufficient..
refer only to minimum contacts under International Shoe and its progeny,
or whether it only refers to minimum contacts criteria in the longarm
statute of the state in which the Federal district is located. Due process
must always be satisfied, under any set of criteria chosen.
II. PATENT VENUE STATUTE
A. History
Since 1897, a special venue statute has been applied to "civil actions
for patent infringement".43 The propriety of the forum was decided by 28
U.S.C. § 1400(b), the patent venue statute, via a two-pronged test. The
second prong of this test has been the subject of much litigation.44 The
patent venue statute twice has been held to be distinct from the general
venue statue by the Supreme Court.45
41Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78.
42 326 U.S. 310 (1946). See also Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 110
S. Ct. 2105 (1990); Asahi Metal Ind., Inc. v. Superior Court of California, Solano
Cty., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985);
Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining
Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
43 The patent venue statute presently reads:
§ 1400. Patents and Copyrights
(b) Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial
district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed
acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1400(b) (West 1976). Compare infra note 53.
15 WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 3823 at 223-234, particularly n. 44 at 225.
4- Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561 (1942); Fourco Glass
Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957).
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The background of venue generally and for patents has been reviewed
above. The debate in the House of Representatives in 1897 prior to its
passage provides insight into the purposes of the legislation and to its
subsequent interpretation.
The bill 46 was introduced in the House by Congressman Lacey of Iowa,
who stated:
The main purpose of the bill is to give original jurisdiction to
the court where a permanent agency transacting the business
is located, and that business is engaged in the infringement of
the patent rights of some one who has such rights anywhere
in the United States. * * * It provides that the court shall have
jurisdiction in the district of which the defendant is an inhab-
itant, and that is the existing law now, or - "In any district
in which the defendant, * * * shall have committed acts of
infringement and have a regular and established place of busi-
ness.
47
During the ensuing discussion, Congressman Mitchell further ex-
plained the need for the act:
[T]he necessity for this law grows out of the acts of 1887 and
1888 which amended the judiciary act. Conflicting decisions
have even arisen in the different districts in the same States
as to the construction of these acts of 1887 and 1888, and there
is great uncertainty throughout the country as to whether or
not the act of 1887 as amended by the act of 1888 applied to
patent cases at all. This bill is intended to remove this uncer-
tainty and to define the exact jurisdiction of the circuit courts
in these matters.
48
The intent of the House of Representatives plainly was to make it easier
for a patentee to bring an action for patent infringement than it was
under the 1887 and 1888 acts, and to remove the confusion among the
courts as to which venue was proper in these cases.49
46 H.R. REP. No. 10202, enacted as Act of March 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695.
41 29 CONG. REC. 1900 (1897). Congressman Mitchell, of the Committee on
Patents, read that committee's one paragraph report into the record:
This bill seeks to define the jurisdiction of the courts in patent suits and
to remove the uncertainty which now arises as to such jurisdiction by reason
of the conflicting decisions of the various circuit courts. It further facilitates
the bringing of suits in the place of business of the parties interested. It is
in the interests of all and against the interest of none. The committee
therefore recommend its passage.4 1 Id. at 1901.
49 See supra note 14, and cases cited in 29 CONG. REG. at 1901. Both In re
Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653 (1893), and In re Keasby & Mattison, 160 U.S. 221 (1895),
had failed to clarify matters for the circuit courts.
1991]
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Note, however, that while this venue provision was broader than that
afforded by the 1887 and 1888 acts, it was nevertheless narrower than
that allowed by the First Judiciary Act in 1789. The 1789 Act allowed
suit to be brought wherever the defendant could be found, 5 as stated in
the Court's In re Hohorst decision,51 which also held that neither patent
infringement nor suits against aliens were controlled by the venue lim-
itations of the 1887 and 1888 Acts.52 As compared to the law of Hohorst,
the 1897 patent venue statute represented a narrowing of venue law.
As enacted in 1897, the patent venue statute provided two tests for
proper venue. 53 Thus, as shown by the stated intent of the drafters and
the plain meaning of the statute, Congress intended to broaden the scope
of available venue, relative to the 1887-1888 venue statute, and to remove
the confusion from the circuit courts when it passed the patent venue
statute.
B. Modern Patent Venue Statute
The modern version of this statute has been in place since 1948,' 4
although the two-prong test for proper venue has not been substantially
changed since the original was passed in 1897.55 As interpreted by the
- Judiciary Act of 1789, Chap. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78. This effect of narrowing
venue as compared to the 1789 Act was noted by Congressman Mitchell: "Under
the line of decisions which permit [the defendant's] being sued anywhere 'if found,'
this act makes it easier for the defendant, and really limits to that extent the
jurisdiction of the court[.]"
29 CONG. REC. at 1901.
"' In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653 (1893).
52 Id. at 662.
5 As enacted in 1897, the patent venue statute read:
Be it enacted.. . That in suits brought for the infringement of letters patent
the circuit courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction, in law or in
equity, in the district of which the defendant is an inhabitant, or in any
district in which the defendant, whether a person, partnership, or corpo-
ration, shall have committed acts of infringement and have a regular and
established place of business. If such suit is brought in a district of which
the defendant is not an inhabitant, but in which such defendant has a
regular and established place of business, service of process, summons, or
subpoena upon the defendant may be made by service upon the agent or
agents engaged in conducting such business in the district in which suit is
brought.
29 Stat. 695 (1897). Compare infra note 54.
" The 1897 act included provision for service of process, which is now codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1694 and reads as follows:
§ 1694 Patent infringement action
In a patent infringement action commenced in a district where the defendant
is not a resident but has a regular and established place of business, service
of process, summons or subpoena upon such defendant may be made upon
his agent or agents conducting such business.
Note the similarity of the language of § 1694 to that of § 1400(b), supra note 43.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1400(b) and 1694 (1991).
5 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (West 1976). See supra, note 43.
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courts prior to the 1988 amendment of§ 1391(c), for corporate defendants5 6
the first prong finds venue proper in the district in which the defendant
corporation is incorporated.57 The second prong finds venue proper in the
district in which the defendant both has committed alleged acts of in-
fringement and has a regular and established place of business.
Acts of infringement are the use, sale or manufacture of an infringing
device. 58 The minimum "regular and established place of business" has
been the topic of much litigation,"9 but usually involves at least an office
with a telephone listing and some sales activity by regular and exclusive
employees of the defendant corporation,60 and has been clearly distin-
guished from the "doing business" required under the pre-1988 general
venue statute .
6
III. EFFECT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Prior to the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(the "Federal Circuit") in 1983, the practice of forum shopping was fre-
quent in patent litigation.6 2 Various federal courts of appeal were thought
to either favor or disfavor patents.6 3 Depending on the strength of the
patent and the favorability of the available circuits, parties could to some
extent choose when and where to bring suit.6"
Another strategic variable in patent litigation has been the choice of
actions available to the parties. A patentee could bring an action for
patent infringement, 65 with venue controlled by the patent venue statute.
An infringer could preempt the patentee's action for infringement by
bringing a declaratory judgment action for patent invalidity and non-
infringement,66 in which venue is controlled by the general venue statute.
56 See, e.g., In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
17 Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 226 (1957); Brunette
Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., 406 U.S. 706, 707 n.2 (1972); Shaw v.
Quincy Mining Co., 145 U.S. 444, 449 (1892).
58 35 U.S.C. § 271 (West Supp. 1990).
19 In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d at 737. See also WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 3823
at 223-234 and n.44 at 225.
o 769 F.2d at 737. (Venue not improper when defendant employs exclusively
two full-time sales representatives in forum.)
61 Mastantuono v. Jacobsen Mfg. Co., 184 F. Supp. 178, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)
(Mere "doing business" in a district is not of itself sufficient to confer venue in
patent suits.).
62 See Richard C. Wydick, Venue in Actions for Patent Infringement, 25 STAN.
L. REV. 551, 551 (1973) [hereinafter Wydick]. See also 15 WRIGHT, supra note 4,
§ 3823, n. 45, at 225; Neal A. Waldrop, The Patent Venue Statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1400(b) Should Not Be Repealed, 4 AM. PAT. L.A. Q.J. 32 (1976); 3 PATENT LAW
& PRACTICE, PATENT LITIGATION: PROCEDURE & TACTICS, § 4.02[1] at 4-4 (1990).
63 H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 20-21, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 11, 12-17.
Id. at 21-22, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 12.
65 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (West Supp. 1990).
28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1990). See generally Jerry D. Voight, Declaratory Judg-
ment Actions in Patent Cases Where There Has Been No Act of Infringement, 72
J. PAT- & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y. 1136 (1990).
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The only limitation on the infringer's declaratory judgment action is that
the "case or controversy" requirement must be met, which requires some
threat of legal action by the patentee against the alleged infringer.
6 7
The net result of the interplay of all these factors was a highly unpre-
dictable route to adjudication of the rights and liabilities of parties in-
volved with a patent.68 The problem was exacerbated by the expense thus
added to already costly patent litigation.
Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982,
granting it jurisdiction, inter alia, over "an appeal from ... a district
court ... if the jurisdiction of that court was based in whole or in part
on [28 U.S.C.] § 1338."69
Today, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has reduced the
need for forum shopping, since it has exclusive jurisdiction of patent case
appeals. 70 The Federal Circuit has provided a significant strengthening
of patents in general, by clarifying the criteria for validity and infringe-
ment and for questions arising during prosecution of patent applications
in the Patent Office.7 1 The Federal Circuit further reduced sources of
procedural litigation in its 1990 decision VE Holding v. Johnson Gas
Appliance.72 This decision effectively will broaden the number of fora in
which venue is proper in actions for patent infringement against corporate
defendants, since there will now be one less hurdle en route to a consid-
eration of the merits of the infringement action.
The Federal Circuit holds a very special position in relation to "action[s]
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents. '73 The Federal
67 The test for a "case or controversy," is whether the dispute "is definite and
concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests."
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937). The test is "whether
the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial
controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient imme-
diacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment." Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941). See also 6A
JAMES W. MOORE, ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 57.02[5], at 57-14 (2d ed.
1989); 10A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ETAL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2756,
at 576-78 (2d ed. 1983).
68Wydick, supra note 62, at 551.
69 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (West Supp. 1990). See Christianson v. Colt Industries
Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
70 See Rita M. Irani, Jurisdiction and Venue in Patent Cases: Effect of the
Federal Circuit on Construction of the Patent Venue Statute, 69 J. PAT. & TRADE-
MARK OFF. SOCY. 445 (1987). See also Bradford J. Duft, Patent Infrinqement and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 13 AM. INTELL. PROP.
L.A. Q.J. 342 (1985); Jack C. Goldstein, The Federal Circuit's Appellate Juris-
diction Over Federal District Court Patent Cases: The First Three Years, 13 AM.
INTELL. PROP. L.A. Q.J. 271 (1985).
71 See Joseph R. Re, Federal Circuit Jurisdiction Over Appeals from District
Court Patent Decisions, 16 Am. INTELL. PROP. L.A. Q.J. 169 (1988). See also Law-
rence G. Kastriner, The Revival of Confidence in the Patent System, 73 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y. 5 (1991).
71 VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir.
1990). See infra, section IV(A)(4) of this note.
73 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (West Supp. 1990). 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) and § 1292(c)
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Circuit has eliminated many of the former conflicts among the circuits
in interpreting patents and deciding their validity, and has provided a
single guiding light for questions of patent law in the district courts, the
Patent and Trademark Office, and for practitioners in the specialty of
patent law. In effect, the Federal Circuit is the final arbiter of the majority
of patent questions.
7 4
Historically, many of the Supreme Court's grants of certiorari have
been necessitated by conflicts between the Circuit Courts of Appeal. Since
there can no longer be any conflict among the circuits in suits arising
under the patent laws, a major route to the Supreme Court for patent
questions has been removed due to the existence and function of the
Federal Circuit. This fact will remain of vast importance in patent liti-
gation for the foreseeable future.
The following sections will provide some background to the recent de-
cision in VE Holding75 and for predicting future developments.
IV. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN §§ 1391(C) AND 1400(B)
In considering the effects of the 1988 amendment to § 1391(c) on
§ 1400(b), several facts are of primary importance and bear repeating.
The first is the presence of the first phrase of § 1391(c), as amended in
1988, "[flor purposes of venue under this chapter. .. ."76 Second, both §
1391 and § 1400 are found in Chapter 87 of Title 28 of the United States
Code.77 The third is that exclusive power to grant patents is given to the
Federal government by Article I, Section 8 of the United States Consti-
tution, 7 which, fourth, makes patent cases federal questions heard orig-
inally in Federal District Courts.79 Finally, the Federal Circuit has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction in suits arising under the patent laws. 0
A. The Cases
The present broad introductory language of § 1391(c) would appear to
supplant the residence defined in § 1400(b) with the new definition of
74 See generally George M. Schwab, Defending a Patent Case Under the Watchful
Eye of the Federal Circuit, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y. 100 (1988).
76 VE Holding, 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
76 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (West Supp. 1990).
71 Chapter 87 also includes special venue statutes for interpleader, internal
revenue taxes, stockholder's derivative actions, as well as change of venue
§§ 1404, 1406, and 1412.
78 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 10: "The Congress shall have Power to promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
79 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (West Supp. 1990). See Christianson v. Colt Ind., 486
U.S. at 2166.
10 See supra, note 69.
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residence derived from § 1391(c). Such was recently held by the Federal
Circuit in VE Holding.8 ' This interpretation ends approximately 90 years
of application of the special venue statute for cases of patent infringement,
and rejects nearly fifty years of Supreme Court precedent. 2 During the
latter period the Court has twice found that the patent venue statute is
neither supplanted nor supplemented by the general venue statute, in
any of its forms prior to the 1988 version. A brief review of the historical
decisions is necessary to properly set the stage for the Federal Circuit's
holding in VE Holding.
1. Stonite v. Melvin Lloyd 3
The Stonite Court held that venue in patent infringement suits is gov-
erned exclusively by Judicial Code § 48 (the predecessor of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1400(b)), and is not supplemented by Judicial Code § 52 (predecessor
of 28 U.S.C. § 1392(a)).8 4
In Stonite, Petitioner was an inhabitant of the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, and had no regular and established place of business in the
Western District.85 Stonite's codefendant was an inhabitant of the West-
ern District, where the suit was brought.8 6 Respondent claimed venue
was proper under § 52 of the Judicial Code, which allows suits not of a
local nature against two defendants residing in different districts in the
same state to be brought in either district.87
The Stonite Court reviewed the history of general venue provisions and
the legislative history of the patent venue statute.,, The Court stated that
the patent venue act "was intended to define the exact limits of venue in
patent infringement suits," and that it was not intended "to dovetail with
the general provisions relating to the venue of civil suits .... ,19 However,
in contradiction of the legislative history, the Court stated, "Furthermore,
the Act of 1897 was a restrictive measure, limiting a prior, broader venue."9°
This apparent misunderstanding was to have far-reaching effects. The Court
stated that the general venue statute, § 51 of the Judicial Code, was "not
applicable to patent infringement proceedings," and § 48, the patent in-
fringement venue provision, was wholly independent thereof,91 and that
since § 52 (modem § 1392) was merely an exception to § 51, § 48 is also
unaffected by § 52.82
Si VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
82 Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561 (1942); Fourco Glass
Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957).




87 Id. at 566.
8 315 U.S. at 563-567 (1942).
88 Id. at 566.
1 Id. at 560 (citing General Elec. Co. v. Marvel Co., 287 U.S. 430,434-35 (1932)).
91 315 U.S. at 567 (citing General Elec., 287 U.S. at 434-35).
92 315 U.S. at 567.
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2. Fourco v. Transmirra 93
The Fourco Court, citing Stonite, held the patent venue statute to es-
tablish venue for such actions, that the general venue statute, § 1391(c)
"has no application to such actions", and the 1948 revision and recodifi-
cation of § 48 of the Judicial Code "made no substantive change" in that
provision.
9 4
In Fourco, Petitioner, a West Virginia corporation, sued for patent in-
fringement in the Southern District of New York.95 Fourco moved for
dismissal for improper venue since the plaintiff had failed to show any
acts of infringement in that district. Fourco did have a regular and es-
tablished place of business in that district, which alone would not have
allowed venue there since the second prong of the § 1400(b) test would
not have been met. 6
The Court followed Stonite without questioning its reasoning or find-
ings, thus framing the issue as whether the changes in the Judicial Code
in its 1948 revision and recodification substantively altered the patent
venue statute, making it subject to supplementation by the general cor-
porate venue statute.97
The Court found that no substantive changes had been made, and held
"that 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) is the sole and exclusive provision controlling
venue in patent infringement actions, and that it is not to be supple-
mented by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)." 9 Therefore, venue was
improper in the Southern District of New York.
3. Brunette v. Kockum
99
In Brunette the Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) was the exclusive
venue provision for suits against alien defendants, and that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1400(b) was not applicable to patent infringement suits against alien
defendants. 100 In Brunette, Petitioner, a Canadian corporation, was sued
for patent infringement in Oregon. 10' Brunette was served in Oregon
under Oregon's long-arm statute. 0 2 The district court dismissed the action
13 Fourco, 353 U.S. 222 (1957).
Id. at 223.
9' Id. Note that the two elements on the second prong of the § 1400(b) test are
in the conjunctive, so both must be satisfied for venue to be proper. Further, note
that the facts of Fourco show that venue would have been proper under the "doing
business" rubric of § 1391(c) as it read in 1957.
Id. at 228-229.
17 Id. at 225.
98 Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 229 (1957).
19 Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc., 406 U.S. 706
(1972).
100 Id. at 714.
101 Id. at 707.
'02 ORE. REV. STAT. § 14.035 (1963) (repealed 1979).
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for improper venue, since Brunette was a resident of Canada, and did not
have a regular and established place of business in Oregon. It also held
that § 1400(b) is the sole and exclusive venue provision for patent in-
fringement suits.103
The Brunette Court reviewed the history of general venue and patent
venue statutes, and the case of In re Hohorst.10 4 Hohorst was cited for its
holding that suits against aliens were not subject to the limitations of
Federal venue statutes. 10 5 But, in addition to this holding, the Hohorst
Court had stated that patent infringement suits could be brought in any
district, which contributed to the historical conflict among the circuit
courts regarding venue in patent infringement suits prior to 1897.106
As the Brunette Court explained, the confusion thusly created not only
affected the enactment of the patent venue statute, but it continued
through the Fourco and Stonite decisions. 10 7 Recall the Court's statement
in Stonite that the patent infringement venue statute was narrower than
the preexisting law. 108
This statement by the Court in Stonite is correct if the dicta in Hohorst
is regarded as controlling over the venue statutes of 1887 and 1888. Thus,
the patent venue statute when passed, was narrower than that allowed
under Hohorst, but broader than that allowed by the previous statutory
provision.109
The Brunette Court distinguished the issue before it from those facing
the Court in Stonite and Fourco, on the basis that 1391(d) is not derived
from the general venue statutes, even though it is codified there, and on
the basis of the long-standing rule that the venue statutes for domestic
and foreign defendants do not apply to suits against alien defendants. 110
The Brunette holding, which allowed a subsection of the general venue
statute to supersede the patent venue statute,"' was cited frequently in
103 406 U.S. at 707.
104 In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653 (1893).
105 Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc., 406 U.S. 706,
709 (1972) (citing Hohorst, 150 U.S. at 660-661).
106 See supra, note 14 and accompanying text.
"0 406 U.S. at 713.
108 315 U.S. at 566. "Furthermore, the Act of 1897 was a restrictive measure,
limiting a prior, broader venue." General Elec. Co. v. Marvel Co., 287 U.S. 430,
434-35 (1932). Thus there is little reason to assume that Congress intended to
authorize suits in districts other than those mentioned in that Act. 315 U.S. at
566-567.
1o See Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc., 406 U.S. 706,
713 n.13 (1972), in which Justice Marshall provides some explanation of the
historical interplay of these venue statutes.
110 406 U.S. at 713.
"I Note that the Court in Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653, held that aliens were not
included in the venue provisions of the 1887 statute. The Court in Brunette
followed this holding, while at the same time distinguishing § 1391(d) from the
remainder of § 1391.
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district cases1 2 considering the question of the supplementation of
§ 1400(b) by the residence definition of the 1988 version of § 1391(c) prior
to the Federal Circuit's decision in VE Holding, and was also cited by
the Federal Circuit in that decision. 113 The proposition is that if Brunette
allowed a subsection of the general venue statute to prevail over the
patent venue statute, then the patent venue statute is not as "sole and
exclusive" as the Court held in the Stonite and Fourco decisions. As shown
by this analysis, Brunette does not adequately support such a proposi-
tion.'14
4. VE Holding v. Johnson Gas Appliance 15
In VE Holding, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held the
definition of residence in the 1988-amended version of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)
to apply to the entirety of Chapter 87 of Title 28 United States Code,
including the patent venue statute."
6
Prior to the 1988 amendment of § 1391(c)"", VE Holding brought suit
against Johnson and two other defendants, for patent infringement
("VEH-r') in the Northern District of California. The court dismissed the
action as to Johnson for improper venue, since Johnson, an Iowa corpo-
ration, did not have a regular and established place of business in that
district.""
After the effective date of the amendments to § 1391(c), VE Holding
refiled suit against Johnson ("VEH-II"), in the same district, based on
the newly effective form of § 1391(c)." 9 Again Johnson moved to dismiss
for improper venue, and again the court dismissed for improper venue,
based on the exclusivity of the patent venue statute, § 1400(b)."20
112 See, e.g., Jacobson v. Cox Paving Co., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1653 (D. Ariz. 1990);
Biosyntec, Inc. v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 746 F. Supp. 5 (D. Ore. 1990); Joslyn
Mfg. Co. v. Amerace Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1219 (N.D. 111. 1990); Regents of Univ.
of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 734 F. Supp. 911 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Century Wrecker
Corp. v. Vulcan Equip. Co. Ltd., 733 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D. Tenn. 1989); Doelcher
Prods., Inc. v. Hydrofoil Int'l., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 666 (D. Md. 1989).
113 VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1582 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
114 See Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc., 406 U.S. 706
(1972). A careful reading of the Court's Brunette opinion reveals neither intent
nor suggestion to undermine Stonite and Fourco.
115 VE Holding, 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Two later unpublished opinions
in cases with the same issue followed VE Holding's holding regarding the effects
of § 1391(c) on § 1400(b): Ross v. Tuerk, Case No. 90-1075 (Fed. Cir. November
8, 1990), and Century Wrecker v. Vulcan Equipment, Case No. 90-1287 (Fed. Cir.
November 24, 1990).
116917 F.2d at 1575.
117 Judicial Improvements Act, Public Law 100-702, Enacted November 19,
1988, Effective February 7, 1989. See supra, note 2.
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VE Holding appealed both dismissals to the Federal Circuit, where the
cases were consolidated for argument.1 21 The issues before the court were
clearly drawn in these cases, involving the same plaintiff, defendant, and
operant facts. In both cases, under the prior residence definition of
§ 1400(b), venue in Northern California was improper, while equally
clearly, if the new residence definition of§ 1391(c) was applied to § 1400(b),
venue would properly lie in that district.122
After stating the facts of VEH-II, 12 3 the court briefly reviewed the his-
tory of venue, the patent venue statute vis-a-vis the general venue stat-
ute, 24 and the legislative history of the 1988 amendment to the general
venue statute. 25 Previous cases applying provisions of the general venue
statute to the various special venue statutes which abound in Federal
law, several of which are in Chapter 87 along with § 1400(b), were dis-
cussed; the court found "little consistency from area to area.' 26
The court reviewed Stonite,127 Fourco,2 8 and In re Cordis,'2 9 in which
the patent venue statute had been clearly distinguished from the general
venue statute, but distinguished Brunette, 30 which it later discussed in
more detail. The court contrasted § 1400(b) with the pre-1988 version of
§ 1391(c),' 2 ' then, based on the substantial change in the statutory lan-
guage of the 1988 amendment, stated that Fourco did not apply to the
instant issue. 3 2 Thereafter, the court embarked upon a consideration of
121Id.
122 It is interesting to note that while the same question was involved in both
Ross v. Tuerk, Civil Action No. JH-89-2487 (D. Md. 1990), vacated and remanded,
slip op. (Fed. Cir. 1990) and Century Wrecker Corp. v. Vulcan Equip. Co., Ltd.,
733 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D. Tenn. 1989), affd, slip op. (Fed. Cir. 1990), and all three
cases were before the Federal Circuit at the same time, the Federal Circuit chose
to decide VE Holding. In Ross v. Tuerk, plaintiff Ross filed an action for patent
infringement against Aero Industries and its president, Tuerk. The district court
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for improper venue under § 1400(b);
Ross appealed, arguing that the § 1391(c) residence definition applied. In Century
Wrecker, Century sought to add as a party defendant Vulcan Equipment Company,
Inc., which was a Mississippi corporation and subsidiary of Vulcan Equipment
Company, Ltd., a Canadian corporation. Vulcan did not have a regular and es-
tablished place of business in the Eastern District of Tennessee. The District
Court granted plaintiff's motion under § 1391(c), which Vulcan appealed. Neither
case involved the clear-cut choice offered by the facts of VE Holding. In both
unpublished decisions, the Federal Circuit simply followed VE Holding.
13 The court stated that since VEH-I was filed before the effective date of the
amendment, it would not be further considered. 917 F.2d at 1576 n.2.
14Id. at 1578.
12.Id. at 1576-1577.
126 Id. at 1577.
127 315 U.S. 561 (1942).
128 353 U.S. 222 (1957).
129769 F.2d 733 (1985).
130 406 U.S. 706 (1972).
131VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1578.
112 Id. at 1579. In distinguishing Stonite and Fourco, the court stated simply,
"Section 1391(c) as it was in Fourco is no longer." Id.
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principles of statutory construction, only going far enough past the plain
meaning rule to distinguish the rule that specific statutes are not con-
trolled by general ones, absent a clear legislative intention. 33 Finally,
the court added that "the language of the statute would reveal 'a clear
intention' that § 1391(c) is to supplement § 1400(b)".' 34
The Federal Circuit noted the lack of legislative history of the 1988
amendment to § 1391(c). 135 The court pointed out that from a time early
in the process of assembling the Act, the change in definition of corporate
residence was included, and cited this lack of alteration as evidence of
congressional intent to apply the new definition to the whole of Chapter
87.136
What the Federal Circuit seems to have said in VE Holding concerning
the interaction of the patent and general venue statutes may be sum-
marized as follows: when passed, the patent venue statute was in actuality
somewhat broader than the general venue statute, although this was not
clearly supported by Stonite,13 7 which was merely followed by Fourco.'3 8
By the time Brunette139 was decided, general venue was much broader
than patent venue. Thus, the finding that the 1988 amendment applies
to patent venue is supported by the resulting broadening of patent venue,
bringing it back into line with general venue for corporate defendants.
The court briefly mentioned an A.B.A. report 140 and law review
articles"'s which had called for the repeal of § 1400(b), and joined the
court's voice to those prior voices, adding that not all civil actions arising
under the patent laws are covered by § 1400(b).1 42
In conclusion, the Federal Circuit held that since § 1391(c)'s definition
of residence is applicable to § 1400(b) and Johnson had stipulated that
VE Holding had obtained personal jurisdiction over it in the Northern
District of California, Johnson therefore "resides" in that district and
venue there is proper.143 The Supreme Court denied Johnson's petition
"
3I Id. at 1579-80, (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235,
242-43 (1989)).
114 917 F.2d at 1580.
,' Id. See also: PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 39, 425-26 and
435-40 (1990); PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 41, 3 (1990).
116 VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1581-82, (citing Century Wrecker v. Vulcan Equip.
Co., Ltd., 733 F. Supp 1170 (E.D. Tenn. 1989)). On the contrary that the wording
of the amended venue provision remained unchanged through at least two years
of Congressional consideration could as easily be cited for the proposition that
Congress failed to express any intention in regard to these words, perhaps even
that the import of the words was neither recognized nor considered by Congress.
315 U.S. at 566.
, 353 U.S. at 225.
,19 406 U.S. at 712 n.13.
,40 In 1974 the American Bar Association Patent, Trademark and Copyright
Section, Committee 110, proposed legislation to incorporate the contemporary
residence definition of § 1391(c) into § 1400(b).
"I, See Richard C. Wydick, Venue in Actions for Patent Infringement, 25 STAN.
L. REv. 551, 551 (1973). But see Neal A. Waldrop, The Patent Venue Statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1400(b) Should Not Be Repealed, 4 AM. PAT. L. A. Q.J. 32 (1976).
142 VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1584.
143 Id.
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for certiorari in VE Holding.14 Johnson had argued that Congress did
not intend to affect § 1400(b), that Brunette did not allow a subsection of
the general venue statute to supplement or supplant § 1400(b), but rather
merely followed the long precedent regarding suits against aliens, and
finally, that Fourco clearly stated that the patent venue statute was not
to be supplemented in any way by the general venue statute, no matter
how inclusive the language of § 1391(c). 14 5
B. Importance of the Federal Circuit Decision in VE Holding
Besides the obvious importance of the holding of any circuit court of
app. i in the United States, the decision by the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in VE Holding is of considerable importance in patent
law. This is true for several reasons. First, and most important, it allows
significantly broader choices of venue to plaintiffs in patent infringement
actions. Second, by finally settling the criteria for venue, the court has
helped to reduce the time and expense involved in reaching the merits
in these actions. Third, it has placed venue in patent infringement actions
into line with venue in other actions arising under the patent laws, and
with other civil suits generally, where corporations are defendants. Thus,
the effect given to Congress's amendment of the general venue statute
by the Federal Circuit in VE Holding should have far-reaching effects in
patent law.
Prior to VE Holding, in civil actions for patent infringement, the ques-
tion of venue was the most difficult of the procedural questions to answer.
If venue was proper, there was little or no question of obtaining personaljurisdiction, since under either prong of § 1400(b)'s two-prong venue test
the requirements of the Due Process Clause for personal jurisdiction
would be surpassed' 46 by any criteria of Supreme Court cases 47 or state
minimum contacts doctrine.
After VE Holding, venue in patent infringement cases is contingent
upon the obtainment of personal jurisdiction. 148 Thus, the level of inquiry
,44VE Holding, 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1315(1991).
14- PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIQHT J. (BNA) No. 41, 429-30 (1991).
" See Rita M. Irani, Jurisdiction and Venue in Patent Cases: Effect of the
Federal Circuit on Construction of the Patent Venue Statute, 69 J. PAT. & TRADE-
MARK OFF. Soc'y. 445 (1987).
147 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and progeny,
supra n.42. Supreme Court personal jurisdiction cases will be further discussed
in Section V (B) of this note.
148 VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1584 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (West Supp. 1990).
The Federal Circuit holding in VE Holding has been followed, allowing a district
court to avoid the "dimcult question" of what constitutes "a regular and estab-lished place of business." The court found venue proper under VE Holding, when
it was questionable under the second prong of the patent venue statute. Matter
of Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent, 750 F. Supp. 330,333-34 (N.D. Ill. 1990). See also Jacobson v. Cox Paving Co. 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1653(D. Ariz. 1990). The holding of the Federal Circuit in VE Holding has been
extended to bring venue for partnerships under the control of§ 1391(c) in Injection




VENUE IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT
has been reduced from that of "what constitutes a 'regular and established
place of business'?" to that of "what minimum contacts satisfy due
process?"'149 This constitutes a much broader range of possible venues for
most patent cases. 15
0
The change in venue statutes should reduce the expense of patent
litigation, and generally make it easier to reach the merits of an action
without being forced into a premature or unfavorable settlement due to
financial pressures on the litigation budget.
It should be noted that while venue is now proper if personal jurisdiction
can be obtained, since venue is concerned with convenience to the litigants
and witnesses,"' the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1404 is still available by
which the defendant may seek a change of venue to a more convenient





V. VENUE IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT - A QUESTION OF DUE PROCESS
A. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (F.R.C.P.), Rules
4(c)(2)(C)(i),' 5 3 4(e) and 4(f) prescribe service of process within and without
the state. Rule 4(e) provides service in two circumstances. First, when a
Federal statute or court order so provides, service may be made pursuant
to the F.R.C.P. Second, in part (1) of the second sentence, F.R.C.P. 4(e)
provides "for service ... upon a party not an inhabitant or found within
the state ... under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in
the statute or rule" allowing such service.15 4
Service of process is provided for in patent suits under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1694,155 thus coming within the scope of the first sentence of F.R.C.P.
149 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (West Supp. 1990) with 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)
(West, 1976).
150 But see David D. Siegel, Changes in Federal Jurisdiction and Practice Under
the New Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, 123 F.R.D. 399, 406(1989), wherein the author suggests that venue has been narrowed due to the
removal of the "licensed to do business" factor, and the fact that districts are
tested for venue as if separate states.
151 VEHolding, 917 F.2d at 1576 (citing 1A(2) JAMES W. MOORE, ETAL., MOORE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE, 0.340 (2d ed. 1990)).
- 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (West 1976) allows a district court to transfer any civil
action to any other district where it might have been brought, for the convenience
of parties and witnesses.
"I Note that Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i) provides for instate service only upon
defendants who are "individuals other than an infant or an incompetent person,"
4(d)(1), and a "domestic or foreign corporation or upon a partnership or other
unincorporated association," 4(d)(3). FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i).
-6' FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
-' See supra note 53, 28 U.S.C. at 1694.
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4(e). However, this is not the sole method of serving process in patent
suits.156 Part (1) of the second sentence of F.R.C.P. 4(e) makes state long-
arm statutes and rules available in Federal cases, such as patent in-
fringement.
F.R.C.P. 4(f) allows service beyond the territorial limits of the state in
which the district court is held "when authorized by a statute of the United
States or by these rules,' 157 referring to F.R.C.P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i) and 4(e) in
using "by these rules.'
1 58
The importance of the availability of state long-arm statutes lies less
in the listed criteria than in the fact that the statute is available to extend
the scope of Federal litigation beyond state boundaries. In fact, in some
states, the long-arm statute allows out of state service under any criteria
consistent with due process, without enumerating specific criteria. 159
Under the interpretation described herein, the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution actually
controls the issue of personal jurisdiction and, therefore, of venue as well.
The factors included in International Shoe and progeny and the state's
appropriate long-arm law would be factors to be considered by the court
in assessing the question of personal jurisdiction. 160 The many factors
considered by courts over the years in evaluating "doing business" would
be applicable, as would other legal doctrines, such as waiver and con-
sent.1 6 '
16 Welch Scientific Co. v. Human Eng'g Inst., Inc., 416 F.2d 32, 34 (7th. Cir.
1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 1003 (1970).
'7 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
4A WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1113 at 239
(2d ed. 1987).
11" Wilden Pump & Eng'g. Co. v. Versa-Matic Tool, Inc., No. 91-1562 SVW (Sx),
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12316 at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 1991) (Finding Versa-
Matic's purposeful availment of the forum to comport with due process.) See, e.g.,
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973) ("A court of this state may exercise
jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or
of the United States.") Accord North American Pyrotec Inc. v. Mol, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d
1718 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (Venue proper in California in copyright infringement action
based on defendant's contracts for use of allegedly infringing computer program
in California.)
- FMC Corp. v. Hunter Eng'g. Co., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1077, 1078 (E.D. Ark. 1991)
(using Arkansas long-arm statute to find venue proper when Hunter did 1% of
its nationwide business in the forum.) See WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 3811 at 20-
21 (Supp. 1991).
'"' Nierbo v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Co., 308 U.S. 165, 167 (1939) (Defendant
lost privilege to contest venue by appointment of statutory agent as required by
state law.) MOORE, supra note 4, 4.15 at 4-156. Thus, if under State law any
corporation doing business in the state must designate an agent for receiving
service of process, not only has the corporation waived its right to allege improper
service in the state, it has also waived its right to contest venue in any district
in which it could be properly served with process, under the present language of
§ 1391(c). See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.07 (Baldwin 1990). This would
extend to a state official statutorily designated as agent for service of process of
a corporation. Consent to personal jurisdiction may also be made, as in a contract.
See National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
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B. International Shoe and Progeny
Since venue is now predicated upon personal jurisdiction and personal
jurisdiction must meet the strictures of due process, the focus of the
jurisdictional inquiry must be on the nexus of patent infringement, min-
imum contacts, personal jurisdiction, due process, and venue. In order to
address these questions, hypothetical facts of a patent infringement suit
will be considered in the context of holdings from some of the recent
progeny of International Shoe,162 with a view toward finding the minimum
level of activity necessary to obtain personal jurisdiction in a given federal
judicial district.
Under the Court's holding in International Shoe, due process requires
certain minimum contacts with the forum "such that maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice."' 163 Furthermore, due process "includes fair warning that a particular
activity may subject a person to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign."'1
"Fair warning" leads to the foreseeability that some level of contact with
a forum will bring a person under the jurisdiction of that forum's courts.
The World Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson 165 Court stated that being haled
into court should be reasonably foreseeable to a defendant in a forum
where it had engaged in some purposeful conduct, if those contacts are
sufficient to subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction consistent with
the Due Process Clause.166 Thus, in Woodson, although it was foreseeable
that defendant's automobile would be driven into Oklahoma, it was not
foreseeable that defendant would be subject to suit there, since the de-
fendant maintained no other contacts with the forum.
16 7
These contacts must have a basis in "some act by which the defendant
purposely avails itself of the privilege of conducting activity within the
forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws."'6 8 The
"purposeful availment" requirement "ensures that a defendant will not
be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of 'random,' 'fortuitous,' or
'attenuated' contacts, or of the 'unilateral activity of another party."' 6 9
The reciprocal relationship between the defendant and the forum seeking
to exercise jurisdiction makes it fair that the forum do so. By its exercise
of the privilege of conducting business activities in the forum state, the
defendant is put on "clear notice" and so should reasonably foresee that
it is subject to suit there. 70
'162 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); see supra, note
42. 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
16 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977)(Stevens, J., concurring).
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
16 Id. at 297.
167 Id. at 295, 298.
,61 Id. at 297 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). See also
Asahi Metal Indus., Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987).
169 Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985).
110 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
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When addressing the sufficiency of minimum contacts for personal jur-
isdiction, the court must consider the "relationship among the defendant,
the forum and the litigation."17' The contacts between the defendant and
the forum must be judged "in light of the claim" with the analysis seeking
whether it is "fair" to compel the defendant to defend in the forum state. 172
Finally, before beginning this analysis, a review of general and specific
jurisdiction is necessary. 73 "Specific" jurisdiction over a defendant arises
when the defendant is haled into court in a suit arising out of the operant
facts which bestow personal jurisdiction on the court in which suit is
brought. 174 "General" jurisdiction arises when a defendant's activities
within the forum are so pervasive that the defendant may be haled into
court for causes having no connection with the forum without offending
due process.175 Specific jurisdiction is muddied somewhat by questions of
whether the cause of action must arise from or only be related to de-
fendant's forum contacts.176 Further confusion between general and spe-
cific jurisdiction was generated by Keeton v. Hustler Magazine Inc.,177
where the Court seems to have combined related and unrelated contacts
by holding in Keeton that jurisdiction was proper in New Hampshire. 178
The essential difference in finding jurisdiction proper under the general
and specific tests is that the defendant's contacts with the forum must be
more extensive to support general jurisdiction than for specific. In other
words, the necessary minimum contacts are at a higher level for general
jurisdiction. 79
In Keeton, defendant Hustler had sold 10,000 to 15,000 copies of each
monthly issue of its magazine in New Hampshire. Five of the issues were
alleged by plaintiff to have contained libelous material. 80 The Court held
"I' Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775 (1984) (quoting Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)).
"' Keeton, 465 U.S. at 775.
171 See also Arthur von Mehren & Donald Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate:
A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966) (on the Court's development
of specific and general jurisdiction).
174 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, n.8(1984).
- Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). An excellent
discussion of specific and general jurisdiction is found in GENE R. SHREVE & PETER
RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 17-18 at 68-76 (1989).
178 See generally William J. Knudsen, Jr., Keeton, Caulder, Helicopteros and
Burger King - International Shoe's Most Recent Progeny, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 809(1985); Louise Weinberg, The Helicopter Case and the Jurisprudence of Jurisdic-
tion, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 913 (1985).
71 Keeton, 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
17 Id. at 781. Note that since the injury was nationwide, no matter in which
district suit is brought only a fraction of the damage will have been inflicted in
that state, unless the plaintiff is restricted to bringing suit in her home state.
171 Perkins, 342 U.S. at 445. See also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). Accord Plastic Films, Inc. v. Poly Pak America, Inc.,
764 F.Supp. 1238 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (Venue improper since defendant's contacts
relating to non-infringing products do not provide the necessary nexus with the
plaintiffs alleged injury.)
so Keeton, 465 U.S. at 772.
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that since Hustler had "continuously and deliberately exploited the New
Hampshire market, it must reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there in a libel action based on the contents of the magazine." '1 In ad-
dition, the Court held that the nationwide damage arising from the libel
made it fair to compel the defendant to defend in one action in one state
for the entire damage."8 2
Under an analysis similar to that of the Court in Keeton, if a patent
infringer was found to have regularly sold copies of the infringing article
there, the infringer could be held to have directed his activities at the
forum, and jurisdiction would be proper.18 3 If the infringer was involved
in other business in the forum, the chances would increase that a court
would find personal jurisdiction proper. Specific jurisdiction would arise
from multiple sales or regular manufacture of an infringing device, with
a factual basis such as in Cordis.18 4 General jurisdiction might be found
in a district where no infringing sales or manufacturing had taken place,
but where the defendant has conducted extensive but unrelated business
activity."18
Jurisdiction based on infringing use of a patented device would be very
fact-dependent since the use might be either central or peripheral to
defendant's operations in a particular forum. Presumably, a higher selling
price or value for the infringing article would reduce the number of de-
vices sold or manufactured which are necessary to allow a finding of
activity directed at the forum.
The aspects of Keeton which make it especially apt for comparison to
a patent infringement suit are that the damage alleged in the libel suit
in Keeton was nationwide in scope8 6 and the plaintiff was seeking to
recover for the nationwide damage in a single action.8 7 Without specif-
ically saying so, the Court in Keeton appeared to state that due to the
nationwide damage, it was fair to require the suit to be tried in a district
involving some inconvenience to defendant, since the matter could be
adjudicated in a single action causing less inconvenience than would
multiple lawsuits brought in multiple states.
As in Keeton, the damage litigated in most patent infringement suits
is national in scope since patent rights are conferred under federal law.
181 Id. at 781. Another libel case, Caulder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), was
decided the same day as Keeton on a similar basis.
112 Id. at 775.
183 As this Note goes to press, courts are employing similar analyses to the
issue of personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Wilden Pump & Eng'g. Co. v. Versa-Matic
Tool, Inc., No. 91-1562 SVW (Sx), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12316 at *2 (C.D. Cal.
July 22, 1991) (finding Versa-Matic's purposeful availment of the forum to comport
with due process).
"8 Cordis, 769 F.2d at 735. (Venue not improper when defendant employs
exclusively two full-time sales representatives, who maintain home offices with
inventories of $30-60,000, literature and other documents and have telephone
listed and answered with defendant's corporate name.)
185 Perkins v. Benguet Conso. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448 (1952).
'6Keeton, 465 U.S. at 777.
187 Id. at 775.
1991]
25Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1991
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
As the "single publication rule" applies to libel suits,88 requiring liti-
gation of all issues and damages arising out of a libel in a unitary pro-
ceeding, 8 9 so should an action for nationwide patent infringement against
any one infringer be litigated in one proceeding. However, this may pres-
ent some problems in patent infringement cases not present in libel cases
since there may be multiple related or unrelated infringers. Recalling
that patent infringement is "the making, use, or sale of' an infringing
article,19° the sale of any one infringing article may implicate three dis-
crete infringers. Furthermore, there may be more than one manufacturer
of infringing articles, and the several manufacturers may infringe various
of the patent's claims.
Additional light may be shed on the due process requirements for per-
sonal jurisdiction in an action for patent infringement by considering the
Court's analysis in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz. 15 In that case, Rud-
zewicz had negotiated a long-term contract with Burger King in Florida,
without ever having been to Florida. 192 The Court found jurisdiction
proper in Florida, based not solely on the contract, but on such factors
as "prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with
the terms of the contract and the parties' actual course of dealing,"'
193
which must be considered in the analysis of defendants' activities alleged
to establish minimum contacts. The Court found that the contract, which
included a carefully structured 20-year relationship with Burger King's
Miami headquarters and payments to be made to Burger King there,
"grew directly out of 'a contract which had a substantial connection with
that State.."' 1
94
Analogizing to a patent infringement case, the infringer may only have
entered into a number of sales of an infringing device or contracted with
a distributor in the forum and never have actually entered the forum,
yet properly be subjected to the personal jurisdiction of the courts there.
This scenario would require a clear intention by the accused infringer to
establish a relationship with the forum or some entity therein. 9 5 Such a
finding would be aided by, e.g., a long-term contract with a local distrib-
utor or other contractual ties with the forum. Local advertising, even
where sales were by mail only, provides an example of further contacts.
118 Id. at 773, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A, Appendix, Re-
porter's Note (1977).
189 Keeton, 465 U.S. at 777.
"9 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1990).
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1985).
192 Id. at 467.
113 Id. at 479. Accord Asahi Metal Ind., Inc. v. Superior Court of California,
480 U.S. 111, 112 (1987).
194 Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 479 (quoting McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
195 See, e.g., Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 112 ("The 'substantial connection'
between the defendant and the forum State necessary for a finding of minimum
contacts must come about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed
toward the forum State.").
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Certainly, the possibilities enumerated and briefly analyzed here are
by no means exhaustive, nor are they intended to be extreme. These are
a few examples only, used to suggest the breadth of venue possibilities
now open to a patent infringement plaintiff. The question of whether such
broadened venue possibilities exist for the infringer seeking to obtain a
declaratory judgment of patent invalidity has not been considered. How-
ever, due to the 1988 amendment to § 1391(c), when the defendant is a
corporation venue must always be tested by these criteria. 196 This analysis
has demonstrated that the change in the definition of "residence", accom-
plished by the combined effects of the 1988 amendment to § 1391(c) and
the Federal Circuit in VE Holding, has significantly broadened venue
choices in civil actions for patent infringement.
VI. CONCLUSION
This note has reviewed the history of venue, both generally and in cases
of patent infringement, the historical interactions of these venue statutes,
the 1988 amendment to the general venue statute, the interpretation of
this amendment by the Federal Circuit, and finally the effects these
changes may have in future actions for patent infringement.
As it regards venue in actions for patent infringement, the 1988 amend-
ment to the general venue statute has accomplished two results. First,
it has redefined the residence of a corporate defendant, predicating res-
idence for venue purposes on the availability of personal jurisdiction over
that defendant. Second, the amendment has applied the new definition
of residence for corporate defendants to the patent venue statute, dis-
placing the previous definition of residence as used in the first prong of
that statute for corporate defendants.
Thus, venue in a civil action for patent infringement brought against
a corporate defendant will be proper in any federal judicial district in
which the defendant is subject to the in personam jurisdiction of the court.
The second prong of the patent venue statute thus has been rendered
nugatory in regard to the corporate defendant since "a regular and es-
tablished place of business" is a more difficult test to satisfy than that
for in personam jurisdiction.
The patent venue statute remains applicable to non-corporate defend-
ants. The question arises regarding why a separate and distinct test for
venue should be applied to defendants based solely on the form of business
enterprise the defendant has chosen. No obvious answers appear, nor
have any been suggested, either in the legislative history of the 1988 Act,
by the Federal Circuit panel in VE Holding, or by commentators.
196Except when a special venue statute not in Chapter 87 exists, is applicable,
and is not capable of supplementation by the general venue statute.
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Consistent with the reasons discussed in the foregoing note, the Federal
Circuit decision in VE Holding has been allowed to stand, due to the
denial of Johnson's petition for certiorari.197 Thus, absent further congres-
sional amendment, the thorough and well-reasoned opinion of the Federal
Circuit in VE Holding will control the issue of the residence of corporate
defendants in patent infringement suits. Due to the significant position
of the Federal Circuit in patent appeals, and the reluctance of the Su-
preme Court to grant certiorari, this decision is unlikely to be overruled
judicially in the foreseeable future.
For many years, commentators have suggested the need to repeal the
patent venue statute. 19 The Federal Circuit panel which decided VE
Holding added their voices to those calling for repeal of this statute.'
As applied by the Federal Circuit under the 1988 amendment, venue
in patent infringement has been broadened as to the corporate defendant
relative to non-corporate defendant. In order to equalize venue in cases
of patent infringement, Congress should either broaden venue choices for
non-corporate patent infringement defendants or repeal the entirety of
the patent venue statute. This latter would result in venue in all patent
infringement suits to be determined by the general venue statute.
THOMAS W. ADAMS
197 V.E. Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir.
1990), cert. denied 111 S.Ct. 1315 (1991).
198 See, e.g., Richard C. Wydick, Venue in Actions for Patent Infrinqement, 25
STAN. L. REV. 551, 584 (1973). But see Neal A. Waldrop, The Patent Venue Statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) Should Not Be Repealed, 4 AM. PAT. L.A. Q.J. 32 (1976).
9 VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1583.
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